Trump and Harris are sharply divided on science, but share common ground on US technology policy
- Written by Kenneth Evans, Scholar in Science and Technology Policy, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University
For the first time in American history, quantum computing was mentioned[1] by a candidate during a presidential debate, on Sept. 10, 2024. After Vice President Kamala Harris brought up quantum technology, she and former President Donald Trump went on to have a heated back-and-forth about American chipmaking and China’s rise in semiconductor manufacturing. Science and technology policy usually takes a back seat to issues such as immigration, the economy and health care during election season.
What’s changed for 2024?
From COVID-19 to climate change, ChatGPT to, yes, quantum computers, science-related issues are on the minds of American policymakers[2] and voters[3] alike. The federal government spends nearly US$200 billion[4] each year on scientific research and development to address these challenges and many others. Presidents and Congress, however, rarely agree on how – and how much – money should be spent on science.
With the increasing public focus on global competitiveness[5], the climate crisis[6] and artificial intelligence[7], a closer look at Trump’s and Harris’ records on science and technology policy could provide a hint about how they’d approach these topics if elected this fall.
Two distinct visions for science funding
If politics can be described as “who gets what and when,” U.S. science and technology policy can be assessed[8] through the annual budget process for R&D. By this measure, the differences between the Trump and Biden-Harris administrations couldn’t be starker.
In his first budget request to Congress[9], in 2017, Trump spurned decades of precedent, proposing historic cuts across nearly every federal science agency. In particular, Trump targeted climate-related programs[10] at the Department of Energy, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Trump’s fiscal policy took a page from Reagan-era conservative orthodoxy[11], prioritizing military spending over social programs, including R&D. Unlike Reagan, however, Trump also took aim at basic research funding[12], an area with long-standing bipartisan support[13] in Congress. His three subsequent budget proposals were no different[14]: across-the-board reductions to federal research programs, while pushing for increases to defense technology development and demonstration projects.
Congress rebuked[15] nearly all of Trump’s requests. Instead, it passed some of the largest increases to federal R&D programs in U.S. history, even before accounting for emergency spending packages funded as part of the government’s pandemic response.
In contrast, the Biden-Harris administration made science and innovation a centerpiece of its early policy agenda – with budgets to match. Leveraging the slim Democratic majority during the 117th Congress, Biden and Harris shepherded three landmark bills into law: the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act[16], the Inflation Reduction Act[17] and the CHIPS and Science Act[18]. These laws contain significant R&D provisions focused on environmental projects (IIJA), clean energy (IRA) and American semiconductor manufacturing (CHIPS).
CHIPS set up programs within the National Science Foundation and the Department of Commerce to create regional technology hubs[19] in support of American manufacturing. The act also set ambitious funding targets for federal science agencies, especially at NSF, calling for its budget to be doubled from $9 billion to over $18 billion over the course of five years.
Despite its initial push for R&D, the Biden-Harris administration’s final two budget proposals offered far less to science. Years of deficit spending and a new Republican majority in the House cast a cloud of budget austerity over Congress. Instead of moving toward doubling NSF’s budget, the agency suffered an 8% decrease[20] in fiscal year 2024 – its biggest cut in over three decades. For FY2025, which runs from Oct. 1, 2024, through Sept. 30, 2025, Biden and Harris requested a meager 3% increase for NSF, billions of dollars short[21] of CHIPS-enacted spending levels.
An emerging consensus on China
On technology policy, Biden and Harris share more with Trump than they let on.
Their approach to competing with China on tech follows Trump’s lead: They’ve expanded tariffs[22] on Chinese goods and severely limited China’s access[23] to American-made computer chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
Biden and Harris have also ramped up research security efforts[24] intended to protect U.S. ideas and innovation from China. Trump launched the China Initiative[25] as an attempt to stop the Chinese government from stealing American research. The Biden-Harris administration ended the program[26] in 2022, but pieces of it[27] remain in place[28]. Scientific collaborations between the United States and China continue to decline[29], to the detriment of American scientific leadership[30].
The Biden-Harris administration has also drawn from Trump-era policy to strengthen America’s leadership in “industries of the future[32].” The term, coined by Trump’s then-chief science adviser Kelvin Droegemeier[33], refers to five emerging technology areas: AI, quantum science, advanced manufacturing, advanced communications and biotechnology. This language has been parroted by the Biden-Harris administration as part of its focus on American manufacturing[34] and throughout Harris’ campaign[35], including during the debate.
In short, both candidates align with the emerging Washington bipartisan consensus[36] on China: innovation policy at home, strategic decoupling abroad.
Science advice not always a welcome resource
Trump’s dismissal of and at times outright contempt for scientific consensus is well documented[37]. From “Sharpiegate[38],” when he mapped his own projected path for Hurricane Dorian, to pulling out of the Paris climate agreement, World Health Organization and the Iran nuclear deal, Trump has demonstrated an unwillingness to accept any advice, let alone from scientists.
Indeed, Trump took over two years to hire Droegemeier as director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy[39], or OSTP, doubling the previous record[40] for the length of time a president has gone without a scientific adviser. This absence was no doubt reflected in Trump’s short-on-science budget requests to Congress, especially during the beginning of his administration.
On the other hand, the Biden-Harris administration has promoted science and innovation as a core part of its broader economic policy agenda. It elevated the role of OSTP: Biden is the first president to name his science adviser – a position currently held by Arati Prabhakar[41] – as a member of his Cabinet.
By law, the president is required[42] to appoint an OSTP director. But it is up to the president to decide how and when to use their advice[43]. If the new White House wants the U.S. to remain a global leader in R&D, the science adviser will need to continue to fight for it.
References
- ^ quantum computing was mentioned (abcnews.go.com)
- ^ policymakers (www.politico.com)
- ^ voters (ncses.nsf.gov)
- ^ nearly US$200 billion (ncses.nsf.gov)
- ^ global competitiveness (itif.org)
- ^ climate crisis (climateprimer.mit.edu)
- ^ artificial intelligence (betterworld.mit.edu)
- ^ can be assessed (issues.org)
- ^ first budget request to Congress (www.aaas.org)
- ^ targeted climate-related programs (www.aaas.org)
- ^ Reagan-era conservative orthodoxy (www.aaas.org)
- ^ basic research funding (theconversation.com)
- ^ long-standing bipartisan support (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ were no different (www.aaas.org)
- ^ Congress rebuked (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (www.congress.gov)
- ^ Inflation Reduction Act (www.congress.gov)
- ^ CHIPS and Science Act (www.congress.gov)
- ^ regional technology hubs (www.brookings.edu)
- ^ an 8% decrease (www.science.org)
- ^ billions of dollars short (fas.org)
- ^ expanded tariffs (www.npr.org)
- ^ limited China’s access (cset.georgetown.edu)
- ^ research security efforts (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ China Initiative (www.technologyreview.com)
- ^ ended the program (www.politico.com)
- ^ pieces of it (www.bloomberg.com)
- ^ remain in place (www.justice.gov)
- ^ continue to decline (www.nature.com)
- ^ American scientific leadership (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ industries of the future (science.osti.gov)
- ^ Kelvin Droegemeier (www.science.org)
- ^ American manufacturing (www.whitehouse.gov)
- ^ Harris’ campaign (kamalaharris.com)
- ^ bipartisan consensus (www.foreignaffairs.com)
- ^ well documented (www.science.org)
- ^ Sharpiegate (www.reuters.com)
- ^ White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (www.bakerinstitute.org)
- ^ the previous record (www.washingtonpost.com)
- ^ Arati Prabhakar (www.wired.com)
- ^ president is required (www.congress.gov)
- ^ to decide how and when to use their advice (www.bakerinstitute.org)
Authors: Kenneth Evans, Scholar in Science and Technology Policy, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University
