China can still salvage 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong – here's how

Authorities in Hong Kong may have hoped to start 2020 by putting a turbulent period of sustained, often violent protests^[1] behind them.

Instead hundreds of thousands of protesters^[2] ushered in the new year by taking to the streets. Around 400 were arrested as protesters continued their push for political reform on the densely populated island.

The clash between the government and demonstrators is now seven months long and has served to further erode Hong Kongers’ trust^[3] in China’s commitment to the “one country, two systems” formula.

Under that principle, the region was granted a degree of autonomy^[4] over its own matters in 1997. But a perception that Beijing is increasingly imposing its authority has led not only to a more militant protest movement^[5], but one that is eyeing separation^[6] from the mainland.

As a political scientist who has closely followed political developments in Hong Kong^[7] over the last decade, I have watched trust in Beijing ebb away during the sustained unrest.

If China wants to correct this course and convince Hong Kongers that their best hope lies in autonomy rather than independence, then I believe it must permit genuine democracy in the region.

Cycle of unrest

The people of Hong Kong have not had much of a say^[8] in their own destiny.

Not only did they lack political power as a colony of the British, but they also weren’t consulted in the drafting of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration^[9] that set the terms for the 1997 handover of the territory from the United Kingdom to the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, that agreement offered an implicit bargain to Hong Kongers: They would submit to Beijing’s sovereignty in return for the promise of a “high degree of autonomy” on the basis of “one country, two systems.”

Over the past two decades, major outbreaks of unrest^[11] in Hong Kong have followed attempts by Beijing to impose unwanted measures that violate this bargain. Large-scale protests beat back Beijing-directed legislative proposals dealing with sedition^[12] in 2003, national education^[13] in 2012 and extradition^[14] last year. The Umbrella Movement^[15] protests of 2014 succeeded in stymieing Beijing’s proposed revisions to Hong Kong’s system for selecting its chief executive, but protesters’ demands for universal suffrage and an open nomination process were rejected.

Many Hong Kongers consider this interference^[16] a violation of the promised autonomy built into the terms of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law^[17], Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. This interference reinforces fears that the city will lose its autonomy entirely after 2047, the end point of commitments made under the Joint Declaration.

With only limited and inadequate democratic mechanisms at their disposal, Hong Kongers have developed a vibrant and increasingly militant protest culture as a primary means for exercising political influence.

Autonomy or independence?

Efforts to steer Hong Kong toward greater integration with the mainland have backfired, undermining trust^[18] in Beijing’s promise of a “high degree of autonomy.”

The result is an ongoing cycle of radicalization. The focal point for many protesters has moved away from any one particular issue to focus on the fundamental status of Hong Kong’s relationship to China.

Growing numbers of people are questioning why they should keep their side of the bargain – accepting Beijing’s sovereignty over Hong Kong. According to a recent Reuters poll^[19], 17% of Hong Kongers express outright support for independence from China, while another 20% express dissatisfaction with the “one country, two systems” model. Moreover, 59% of respondents said they supported the recent protests and over one-third had themselves attended a protest.

According to a separate survey^[20], support for eventual independence among young people approaches 40%. Many young people have also come to reject^[21] any “Chinese” identity^[22] in favor of a “Hong Kong” identity.

The depth of discontent among Hong Kongers was reflected in the District Council elections^[23] held on Nov. 24. These low-level posts have traditionally been dominated by pro-Beijing political parties. The recent elections, however, brought a record turnout with pro-democratic parties winning close to 90% of contested positions.

Beijing’s miscalculation

To blunt the growth of separatist sentiment in Hong Kong, Beijing must tackle what social scientists call a “commitment problem^[24].” In any negotiation, each side will cooperate only if they believe that the other side is both willing and able to carry out any commitments made as part of the bargain. If either side believes the other side’s commitments lack credibility, then cooperation fails.

What China needs to do now is show that it is committed to respecting the autonomy promises embodied in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.

I believe the best way to do that is for Beijing to stop manipulating governance of the city. As long as selection of the chief executive^[25] and a majority of the Legislative Council^[26] lies in Beijing’s hands, it will be difficult for the mainland to resist meddling in Hong Kong’s affairs and for Hong Kongers to feel that autonomy offers them any real say over their fate.

In other words, Beijing could undercut calls for independence and interrupt the cycle of mass protests by offering Hong Kongers the ability to select their leaders through free and fair elections.

Beijing badly miscalculated in 2014 when it proposed electoral reforms that fell far short of the demands of Hong Kong’s pan-democratic camp^[27], a coalition of parties that advocate universal suffrage. As a consequence, older, mainstream leaders lost control of the protest movement to younger, more militant activists^[28]. By 2019, young radicals resorted to violent street actions^[29] coupled with harsh anti-Beijing rhetoric. Yet a move toward democracy could still calm the waters provided the process allowed for genuine and effective local participation.

This proposal may be far-fetched^[30]. Indeed, some accounts suggest that leaders in Beijing are laying plans^[31] to move in the opposite direction by taking more direct control over Hong Kong’s political and legal institutions. Moreover, Beijing worries^[32] that full democracy in Hong Kong might lead to demands for the same elsewhere in China.

If a democratic solution to China’s Hong Kong problem appears unattractive to Beijing, the alternatives may be worse. The current cycle of provocation, protest, radicalization and rising separatism can lead to only one eventual result: a violent crackdown that would damage China’s reputation and leave it in costly occupation of a sullen and defiant population for a generation or more.

[Deep knowledge, daily. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter^[33].]

References

1. ^{^} often violent protests (www.nytimes.com)
2. ^{^} hundreds of thousands of protesters (apnews.com)
3. ^{^} Hong Kongers’ trust (www.hkupop.hku.hk)
4. ^{^} degree of autonomy (www.bbc.com)
5. ^{^} militant protest movement (theconversation.com)
6. ^{^} eyeing separation (www.nytimes.com)
7. ^{^} a political scientist who has closely followed political developments in Hong Kong (scholar.google.com)
8. ^{^} have not had much of a say (www.abc.net.au)
9. ^{^} Sino-British Joint Declaration (researchbriefings.parliament.uk)
10. ^{^} AP Photo/Mike Fiala (www.apimages.com)
11. ^{^} outbreaks of unrest (multimedia.scmp.com)
12. ^{^} sedition (www.telegraph.co.uk)
13. ^{^} national education (www.scmp.com)
14. ^{^} extradition (www.hongkongfp.com)
15. ^{^} Umbrella Movement (qz.com)
16. ^{^} consider this interference (www.scmp.com)
17. ^{^} Basic Law (www.basiclaw.gov.hk)
18. ^{^} undermining trust (www.hkupop.hku.hk)
19. ^{^} Reuters poll (www.reuters.com)
20. ^{^} separate survey (www.scmp.com)
21. ^{^} reject (www.hkupop.hku.hk)
22. ^{^} “Chinese” identity (www.theasanforum.org)
23. ^{^} District Council elections (www.theguardian.com)
24. ^{^} commitment problem (gametheory101.com)
25. ^{^} chief executive (www.telegraph.co.uk)
26. ^{^} Legislative Council (www.google.com)
27. ^{^} pan-democratic camp (thediplomat.com)
28. ^{^} militant activists (www.scmp.com)
29. ^{^} street actions (qz.com)
30. ^{^} far-fetched (www.straitstimes.com)
31. ^{^} laying plans (www.scmp.com)
32. ^{^} Beijing worries (www.pri.org)
33. ^{^} Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter (theconversation.com)