Israel’s death penalty law has little to do with criminal justice and everything to do with ethno-nationalism
- Written by Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass Lowell
In its nearly 80-year history, the state of Israel has carried out only one court-sanctioned execution: Adolf Eichmann[1], a principal architect of the Nazi holocaust.
But under a law passed by the Israeli parliament[2] on March 30, 2026, that restraint has been thrown out the window.
Death by hanging will now become the default sentence for some offenses – but only in effect when the crime is carried out by Palestinians[3].
The law establishes two distinct judicial tracks. For the first, civilian courts in Israel may sentence defendants to death when convicted of killing with intent to “negate the existence of the State of Israel.” Meanwhile, military courts in the occupied West Bank must impose death for killings classified as terrorism, with life sentences permitted only in unspecified “exceptional cases.”
The bill, which also indicated that executions under the military track must be carried out within 90 days, passed by a vote of 62-48, with all major parties in the ruling governing coalition voting in favor[4].
The move further entrenches a two-tiered legal system in which Palestinians in the West Bank are tried exclusively in military courts – tribunals with an approximately 96% conviction rate[5], based largely on confessions often extracted under coercive conditions.
As someone who has been studying political violence and extremism in Israel for more than 20 years[6], I believe that treating this law as merely another chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would miss its deeper significance. Rather, the passing of the death penalty bill is best understood as part of the consolidation of ethno-nationalist ideology in governance, the continued erosion of institutional constraints on state power and the legal codification of retributive policies directed overwhelmingly at Palestinians.
The long arc of institutional capture
Proponents of the law focus on its purported deterrence effect and its potential use to prevent unpopular exchanges of convicted Palestinian terrorists for Israeli hostages. One such exchange – the 2011 Gilad Shalit[7] deal, in which over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners were released in exchange for a single Israeli soldier[8] – included the release of Hamas’ Yahya Sinwar, who later masterminded the attack of Oct. 7, 2023.
However, some senior Israeli security officials, including representatives from the Israel Defense Forces and the intelligence service Shin Bet, dispute these claims, arguing that there is no evidence capital punishment deters terrorism[9].
Potential efficacy aside, the death penalty law did not emerge from a vacuum. It is the product of a political trajectory that has unfolded over decades and has seen the once-fringe settler movement evolve into a dominant force[10] shaping Israeli governance.
When Likud, the right-wing party of current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, first came to power in 1977[11], settlements in the occupied West Bank gained legal status in Israeli law. Since then, settlements have expanded rapidly, despite remaining illegal under international law.
Settlers now represent roughly 6%[12] of Israelis, but their political influence is far greater than their demographic weight. Settlers and settler-aligned public figures have reshaped the institutional landscape[13] by making strategic inroads into military leadership, government ministries and party primaries.
The ruling coalition includes ministers with explicit pro-settler and ethno-nationalist ideologies – most notably Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.
Their ideology promotes Jewish supremacy over the entirety of historic Palestine, including the West Bank, and regards territorial compromise with Palestinians as both a political and theological impossibility[14].
The inclusion of people so closely aligned with the settler movement in Netanyahu’s coalition signaled that anti-Palestinian violence would, in effect, be treated as legitimate expressions of state policy. Indeed, in the past two years, settler violence in the West Bank rose to unprecedented levels[16].
Smotrich moved to transfer control of the Civil Administration – the military bureaucracy that has governed Palestinian civilian affairs in the West Bank since 1967 – from military to finance ministry oversight, reducing institutional checks on settlement expansion[17]. Meanwhile Ben-Gvir issued over 100,000 new gun licenses, granted settlers preferential access to firearms and began transforming the police force toward aggressive, Palestinian-focused enforcement[18].
Through such moves, the line between state security apparatus and settler militancy has become virtually indistinguishable.
The politics of retribution
This is the context within which the death penalty legislation operates. Capital punishment has always been part of the penal code, but with the exception of Eichmann in 1962, it has never been used. This was by choice: Israel for much of its existence wanted to project an image of a democratic modern nation based on the rule of law.
This pivot from deterrence to retribution reflects the religious-nationalist worldview that I believe now dominates Israeli governance. It is rooted in a particular strain of religious Zionism, embraced by roughly 20% of Israeli Jews[19], that interprets the establishment of the state of Israel and its subsequent military victories as a process of divine redemption.
Under this ideology[20], the West Bank is not occupied territory but the biblical heartland of Judea and Samaria – land to which Jews hold an irrevocable, God-given claim.
Adherents believe that accelerating this redemptive process requires total military dominance and the systematic negation of Palestinian national aspirations.
This theology leaves little room for the restraint that characterized earlier security doctrines. Rather, Palestinians are existential obstacles to be vanquished.
In this light, the death penalty becomes not merely a tool of criminal justice but a declaration of supremacy – an instrument through which the state enacts its divine mandate.
Democratic backsliding
Perhaps the most consequential dimension of the legislation is what it makes explicit.
The existence of parallel legal systems for Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories is not new. It has been a structural feature of the Israeli control of the West Bank since 1967[21].
But the death penalty law formalizes this duality with unprecedented starkness.
This formalization matters because it strips away the ambiguity that has long allowed Israeli officials to claim that all persons under their jurisdiction enjoy equal protection of the law.
Scholars of comparative authoritarianism have long identified the selective application of harsh criminal penalties as a hallmark of illiberal governance[23]. The Israeli case offers a particularly instructive example because it unfolds within a nation that continues to maintain democratic institutions for its own citizens while operating an increasingly coercive regime over a subject population.
The death penalty law deepens this contradiction, pushing Israel further along a trajectory that some analysts have described as democratic backsliding. What is clear is that the legislation represents more than a policy choice about capital punishment.
References
- ^ Adolf Eichmann (wwv.yadvashem.org)
- ^ passed by the Israeli parliament (www.pbs.org)
- ^ only in effect when the crime is carried out by Palestinians (www.hrw.org)
- ^ all major parties in the ruling governing coalition voting in favor (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ 96% conviction rate (www.btselem.org)
- ^ studying political violence and extremism in Israel for more than 20 years (scholar.google.com)
- ^ 2011 Gilad Shalit (www.cnn.com)
- ^ in exchange for a single Israeli soldier (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ no evidence capital punishment deters terrorism (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ evolve into a dominant force (theconversation.com)
- ^ first came to power in 1977 (israeled.org)
- ^ now represent roughly 6% (www.timesofisrael.com)
- ^ reshaped the institutional landscape (academic.oup.com)
- ^ political and theological impossibility (theconversation.com)
- ^ Eyal Warshavsky/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ settler violence in the West Bank rose to unprecedented levels (theconversation.com)
- ^ reducing institutional checks on settlement expansion (www.theguardian.com)
- ^ transforming the police force toward aggressive, Palestinian-focused enforcement (www.jpost.com)
- ^ 20% of Israeli Jews (www.pewresearch.org)
- ^ ideology (theconversation.com)
- ^ control of the West Bank since 1967 (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ Erik Marmor/Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ identified the selective application of harsh criminal penalties as a hallmark of illiberal governance (ilr.law.uiowa.edu)
Authors: Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass Lowell