Trump’s lifting of Syria sanctions is a win for Turkey, too – pointing to outsized role middle powers can play in regional affairs
- Written by Hyeran Jo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University
President Donald Trump announced while in Saudi Arabia[1] on May 14, 2025, that the United States would lift sanctions on Syria[2]. The turnaround was a huge victory for the government of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa as he attempts to consolidate power nearly six months on from his movement’s stunning toppling of the longtime regime of Bashar al Assad.
But it wasn’t all down to Syria lobbying on its own behalf. In announcing the policy shift, Trump largely attributed the shift to his Saudi hosts as well as Turkey[3]. Both nations are longtime Assad foes who quickly championed al-Sharaa and have been pushing the U.S. to normalize ties with Syria’s new government.
Turkey, whose resources and land have been heavily affected by instability in neighboring Syria, was particularly instrumental[4] in pushing Trump[5] to accept the post-Assad government, even over objections from Israel.
As experts in international relations[6] and Turkish law and politics[7], we believe the developments in Syria point to the outsized role a small-to-middle power like Turkey can have in regional and international matters. That is particularly true in the Middle East, where world powers such as the U.S. are perceived to have a declining and at times unpredictable[8] influence.
An opening in Syria
After 13 years of devastating civil war[9], Syria faces a slew of large challenges, including the immediate task of state building. Not only is violence still readily apparent in Syria itself – as the recent killing of Alawites[10], allegedly[11] by government forces, or fighters aligned with them, showed – but neighboring Israel has also repeatedly attacked positions[12] in Syria in an attempt to weaken the new government. To Israel’s government, a strong, militarized Syria would pose a threat, particularly in regard to the unstable border[13] at the Golan Heights.
Despite the issues that confront Syria’s new government, it has nonetheless demonstrated[14] a remarkable aptitude for gaining international acceptance – a notable fact given al-Sharaa’s leadership ties to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham[15], a formerly al-Qaeda linked group listed[16] as one of the U.S. foreign terrorist organizations since 2014.
Turkey presses its influence
In this context, Turkey’s hand has been especially important.
Since Trump took office, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has pressed[17] the American president to lift sanctions. The two men had struck up a strong relationship[18] during the first Trump administration, with the U.S. president declaring himself to be a “big fan[19]” of the Turkish leader.
Turkey’s behind-the-scenes diplomacy can be seen as part of its broader effort[20] to fill the vacuum left by Assad’s fall. Doing so not only bolsters Erdogan’s position as a regional player, but it also advances his domestic agenda.
Turkey has moved quickly on numerous fronts in charting the future course of Syria by pursuing economic and security projects[21] in the country. First and foremost, Turkey has upped its investment in Syria[22].
Also, as it did in Libya[23] and Somalia[24], Turkey has contributed to the training[25] and equipping of new Syrian security forces.
In the northeast Syrian province of Idlib, Turkey is funding education, health care and electricity, and the Turkish lira[26] is the de facto currency across northwestern Syria.
The roots of these engagements lie in Turkey’s interest in managing its own security situation.
Since 1984, Turkey has been fighting Kurdish separatist groups, most notably the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which is aligned with the Kurdish YPG militia[27] in northeast Syria – one of the groups that fought Assad’s forces during Syria’s civil war.
Assad’s fall led to Russia’s retreat[29] from Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian influence, too, has waned as a result of not only Assad’s departure, but also the military downgrading of Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. And the U.S. no longer actively supports[30] the Kurdish YPG militia in northeast Syria.
Into this void of external influence, Turkey quickly seized an opportunity to reshape the security landscape.
Ankara, which still controls large chunks of territory in Syria’s northeast from the fight against Assad[31] and Syrian Kurdish groups, agreed to a Syrian plan[32] to incorporate the YPG, the armed wing of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, into the new Syrian army.
The Turkish perspective has long been that the fight against the PKK can succeed in the long run only with stability on Syrian soil. Now, the PKK is trying to reach peace[33] with the Turkish government, but whether the SDF in Syria will disarm and disband is far from certain[34]. As such, having a strong, stable Syrian government in which a Kurdish majority is accommodated may be in Ankara’s best interests.
Meanwhile, al-Sharaa’s success in rebuilding Syria after the civil war would also help Turkey on another front: the issue of Syrian refugees.
Turkey currently hosts around 3.2 million[35] refugees from Syria – the most of any country. The sheer number and length of stay of these displaced people have put a strain on Turkey’s economy and social relations, leading to clashes[36] between Turks and Syrian refugees.
There is also a broad consensus in Turkey that the Syrian refugee problem in Turkey can be solved only through a comprehensive return strategy.
Although naturalized Syrians in Turkey make up an important constituency within the voter base of Erdogan’s ruling AK Party, the only solution currently envisaged by the Turkish president and his allies is repatriation. For this, rapid and stable development of infrastructure and the housing stock in Syria is considered essential.
Prospects for small-to-middle powers
Turkey’s strategic opportunity in Syria is not without clear risks, however. The incursions by the Israeli military illustrates the challenge Turkey faces in advancing its own interests in Syria. It is notable that Trump’s announcement on sanctions was seemingly made without the knowledge[38] – and against the wishes[39] – Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Additionally, Turkey is looking to finesse a growing role in the region into strengthening its position over the long-running dispute in Cyprus. The island, which lies a couple of hundred miles off Syria’s coast, is divided into two regions, with Greek Cypriots in the south and a breakaway Turkish Cypriot north – with only Turkey recognizing[40] the self-declared state in the north. Turkey is trying to regulate maritime jurisdiction in the eastern Mediterranean through an agreement with Syria[41], but the plan is stalled since the European Union supports Greece’s position in Cyprus.
The Turkish moves in Syria are nonetheless being broadly felt elsewhere. Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Qatar support[42] the post-Assad arrangement in Syria and see their own interests being served alongside Turkey’s, although the rivalry[43] of the Sunni world is at stake.
The lifting of sanctions by the U.S. will have long-term political impacts beyond short-term economic impacts. Syria has little direct trade[44] with the U.S., only exporting its agricultural products and antiques. But the appearance of political legitimacy and recognition is a diplomatic win for Turkey[45], as well as for Syria. The political opening brings with it the promise of future investment[46] in Syria.
Turkey’s dealing with Syria showcases how small-to-middle powers can chart the waters of statecraft in their own way. The days of international affairs being dominated by superpowers appear to be over – as many have long predicted[47]. And in Syria, Turkey is providing a blueprint for how small-to-middle powers can work that to their advantage.
References
- ^ announced while in Saudi Arabia (edition.cnn.com)
- ^ lift sanctions on Syria (www.nbcnews.com)
- ^ as well as Turkey (www.reuters.com)
- ^ particularly instrumental (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ in pushing Trump (www.washingtonpost.com)
- ^ experts in international relations (bush.tamu.edu)
- ^ Turkish law and politics (www.hukuk.bilkent.edu.tr)
- ^ declining and at times unpredictable (arabcenterdc.org)
- ^ devastating civil war (www.cfr.org)
- ^ killing of Alawites (www.reuters.com)
- ^ allegedly (www.reuters.com)
- ^ repeatedly attacked positions (www.middleeasteye.net)
- ^ unstable border (theconversation.com)
- ^ nonetheless demonstrated (www.jstor.org)
- ^ ties to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (www.reuters.com)
- ^ al-Qaeda linked group listed (www.state.gov)
- ^ has pressed (www.reuters.com)
- ^ strong relationship (www.turkiyetoday.com)
- ^ declaring himself to be a “big fan (www.cnn.com)
- ^ broader effort (theconversation.com)
- ^ economic and security projects (ecfr.eu)
- ^ investment in Syria (www.reuters.com)
- ^ Libya (libyaobserver.ly)
- ^ Somalia (www.atlanticcouncil.org)
- ^ contributed to the training (www.gazeteduvar.com.tr)
- ^ the Turkish lira (963media.com)
- ^ YPG militia (www.armyupress.army.mil)
- ^ Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ Russia’s retreat (www.reuters.com)
- ^ no longer actively supports (crsreports.congress.gov)
- ^ from the fight against Assad (www.bbc.com)
- ^ agreed to a Syrian plan (www.reuters.com)
- ^ trying to reach peace (theconversation.com)
- ^ far from certain (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ 3.2 million (www.unhcr.org)
- ^ leading to clashes (www.nytimes.com)
- ^ Bandar Aljaloud/Saudi Royal Palace via AP (newsroom.ap.org)
- ^ without the knowledge (thejewishindependent.com.au)
- ^ against the wishes (www.haaretz.com)
- ^ only Turkey recognizing (freedomhouse.org)
- ^ an agreement with Syria (www.egmontinstitute.be)
- ^ support (abcnews.go.com)
- ^ rivalry (www.economist.com)
- ^ little direct trade (www.wsj.com)
- ^ win for Turkey (www.ynetnews.com)
- ^ promise of future investment (apnews.com)
- ^ many have long predicted (www.foreignaffairs.com)
Authors: Hyeran Jo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University
