Civilian support for military coups isn’t a bug – it’s a feature

In September 2024, authorities in Benin detained the country’s former sports minister and a prominent businessman for allegedly plotting a coup^[1] against the West African nation’s president, Patrice Talon. Had a putsch materialized, Benin would have joined a growing list of African countries to have experienced a military coup^[2] over the past four years.

Dubbed an “epidemic of coup d'états^[3]” by United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the resurgence of military takeovers has left many observers perplexed. For one, the frequency of coups^[4] worldwide had reached^[5] historic lows^[6] prior to 2020.

But perhaps even more puzzling is that several of the recent military coups – such as those in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea – have been accompanied by significant civilian support^[7]. Indeed, while various commentaries^[8] or news reports^[9] have treated^[10] civilian support^[11] as an exceptional feature^[12] of this recent coup wave, these perspectives rely on a common misunderstanding.

As I’ve observed over the course of my research on the politics of military coups^[13], civilian support is actually a common, if not critical, part of coup politics, and far from unique to this recent resurgence of military takeovers.

How common are civilian-supported coups?

In the popular imagination of a military coup, power-hungry soldiers command tanks down a capital’s streets to seize authority from the political leadership. In this vision, civilians are often passive actors or otherwise assumed to be the opponents of coups. Yet such a setting is belied by numerous examples, both recent and throughout history.

In West Africa’s Niger, for example, the M62 movement^[15] – a coalition of civil society organizations – gathered its members on the streets to support the coup in July 2023, outnumbering^[16] prior protests calling for the reinstatement of President Mohamed Bazoum. In neighboring Mali, the M5-RFP^[17] protest movement served a similar role in the aftermath of the country’s 2020 coup – although fissures^[18] in its relationship with the junta have since surfaced.

Even Benin’s thwarted plot had a civilian dimension. Its alleged masterminds, the sports minister and prominent businessman who were said to have funded the planned coup^[19], were not soldiers but part of the governing bureaucracy or elite civil society.

To see how common such cases are, I collected data^[20] on civilian support and involvement in all successful military coups since 1950. Defining coups as “successful^[21]” if the soldiers manage to stay in power for at least seven days, that gave me 242 cases over a period of nearly 75 years to analyze, spanning different regions like Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

Out of the 242 episodes, 189 coups – or nearly 80% – saw some type of civilian support, either in the takeover’s instigation or in the later consolidation of power.

Coups without any sign of civilian support were generally those that saw a military leader ousted by other members of the ruling junta – contexts where soldiers already dominated the political landscape.

Breaking down the numbers over time, civilian-supported coups represented the lion’s share in each decade, even as the overall frequency of coups ebbed by the 1990s with the end of the Cold War.

But in the past two decades, virtually every successful coup has been associated with some level of support outside the military. So while civilian support might not be unique to recent cases, there is evidence that it has become a more common fixture of military coups – at least among the successful ones.

Of course, these stats do not include failed coups or thwarted conspiracies. But the failed attempts to instigate a coup in Benin – or, for that matter, in Brazil in January 2023^[22] – suggest that these numbers might underestimate the frequency of civilian support for, and involvement in, coups.

How civilians support coups

In general, civilian support for coups can manifest in different ways. But in a recent study^[23], I identified two broad patterns: instigation and consolidation.

Instigation, by default, occurs in the pre-coup stage and involves civilians taking action to spark a coup attempt.

Protests and insurrections in pursuit of a military coup are common methods of instigation. For example, early in 2023, supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro seized the National Congress^[24] after weeks of publicly calling^[25] on the military to stop President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s inauguration. While their efforts ultimately failed to produce a coup, they are illustrative of the civilian dynamic.

In late 2021, disgruntled members of Sudan’s transitional government organized protests in Khartoum, the capital, calling for the military’s intervention^[26]. The military answered days later^[27] by removing Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok from power.

Instigation can also involve more targeted actions. For instance, the alleged Benin coup plot involved targeting specific members of the security services with bribes in exchange for their participation. In Brazil, recent court documents implicated Bolsonaro himself^[28] in coordinating a coup plot and attempting to ensure the participation of top military leaders.

In other cases, political parties developed secret cells in the armed forces to later give the go-ahead for a coup – like in Bolivia in 1952^[29], Iraq in 1963^[30], Afghanistan in 1978^[31] and Sudan in 1989^[32].

Consolidation, on the other hand, involves actions taken during and in the immediate aftermath of a coup.

This could include actions like taking up arms alongside soldiers during a military takeover, organizing pro-coup protests or assuming important governing tasks alongside a new junta. Here, civilians seek to ensure a coup succeeds and its objectives take root – even against domestic and international opposition.

Among the recent West African cases, civilians have especially worked to consolidate coups against international opposition. For example, after the Economic Community of West African States threatened military intervention to reverse Niger’s coup in 2023, M62 and other civilian-led protest groups rallied to support the coupists^[34]. Thousands also enlisted in the Volunteers for the Defense of Niger, a pro-junta civilian militia^[35] created to combat international intervention against the coupists.

Why civilian coup support matters

Soldiers are unlikely^[36] to even attempt a coup without confidence that at least some civilians will back their efforts.

Portraying civilian support for military takeovers as exceptional thus misses a critical component of coup politics. And this misconception benefits coupists, who can use^[37] civilian allies to present their actions as legitimate or even revolutionary, which is what happened in Egypt in 2013^[38].

Coupists can also retain political influence after stepping aside by ensuring that their civilian supporters^[39] secure power^[40].

Military coups also do not occur in a vacuum. A proper focus on the civilian element of coup politics allows researchers and international observers to better contextualize military takeovers in broader social struggles for the state.

This could lead to greater engagement with the issue of what kinds of civilian segments are instigating and consolidating coups. Are they close to the targeted leader such as in Benin’s alleged plot? Or are they members of the political opposition, like in Niger and Mali?

These nuances should be front and center to researchers, policymakers and diplomats as they seek to understand – and mitigate – sudden and often destabilizing takeovers of a state.

References

1. ^{^} plotting a coup (www.bbc.com)
2. ^{^} military coup (www.aljazeera.com)
3. ^{^} epidemic of coup d'états (www.reuters.com)
4. ^{^} frequency of coups (www.ias.edu)
5. ^{^} had reached (www.pewresearch.org)
6. ^{^} historic lows (newafricanmagazine.com)
7. ^{^} significant civilian support (theowp.org)
8. ^{^} commentaries (theconversation.com)
9. ^{^} news reports (www.reuters.com)
10. ^{^} have treated (www.aljazeera.com)
11. ^{^} civilian support (www.africanliberty.org)
12. ^{^} an exceptional feature (www.theafricareport.com)
13. ^{^} research on the politics of military coups (www.bakerinstitute.org)
14. ^{^} AP Photo/Fatahoulaye Hassane Midou (newsroom.ap.org)
15. ^{^} M62 movement (www.bbc.com)
16. ^{^} outnumbering (www.bbc.com)
17. ^{^} M5-RFP (www.africanews.com)
18. ^{^} although fissures (apanews.net)
19. ^{^} funded the planned coup (www.africanews.com)
20. ^{^} collected data (salahbenhammou.wordpress.com)
21. ^{^} successful (jonathanmpowell.com)
22. ^{^} in Brazil in January 2023 (www.reuters.com)
23. ^{^} recent study (journals.sagepub.com)
24. ^{^} seized the National Congress (www.theguardian.com)
25. ^{^} publicly calling (www.theguardian.com)
26. ^{^} calling for the military’s intervention (www.reuters.com)
27. ^{^} answered days later (www.cnn.com)
28. ^{^} implicated Bolsonaro himself (www.aljazeera.com)
29. ^{^} 1952 (secolas.org)
30. ^{^} 1963 (history.state.gov)
31. ^{^} 1978 (jacobin.com)
32. ^{^} 1989 (sudantribune.com)
33. ^{^} AP Photo/Kilaye Bationo, File (newsroom.ap.org)
34. ^{^} rallied to support the coupists (www.theguardian.com)
35. ^{^} civilian militia (www.aa.com.tr)
36. ^{^} are unlikely (journals.sagepub.com)
37. ^{^} who can use (warontherocks.com)
38. ^{^} Egypt in 2013 (www.businessinsider.com)
39. ^{^} ensuring that their civilian supporters (www.aljazeera.com)
40. ^{^} secure power (theconversation.com)