Voters’ ‘moral flexibility’ helps them defend politicians’ misinformation − if they believe the inaccurate info speaks to a larger truth

Many voters are willing to accept misinformation from political leaders – even when they know it’s factually inaccurate. According to our research^[1], voters often recognize when their parties’ claims are not based on objective evidence. Yet they still respond positively, if they believe these inaccurate statements evoke a deeper, more important “truth.”

Our team conducted a series of online surveys from 2018 to 2023 with over 3,900 American voters. These surveys were designed to elicit responses about how they evaluated political statements from several politicians, even when they recognized those statements as factually inaccurate.

Consider former President Donald Trump’s claims that the 2020 election was stolen from him. Even among supporters who recognized that his claims about fraud were not grounded in objective evidence^[2], we found that they were more likely to see these allegations as important for “American priorities”: for example, they believe the political system is illegitimate and stacked against their interests.

The same logic applies to factually inaccurate statements about COVID-19 vaccinations^[3] that President Joe Biden made, suggesting that vaccinated people could not spread the disease^[4]. In our surveys, voters who supported the president saw the statement as important for American priorities, despite recognizing its factual inaccuracy.

Through these questions, we were able to uncover the criteria that guide voter behavior, depending on who makes which statement. Voters from both parties cared more about “moral truth” when they were evaluating a politician they liked. When evaluating a politician they didn’t like, on the other hand, voters relied more on strict factuality.

Our surveys documented how voters provide such justifications for their partisan standard-bearers, revealing a significant degree of “moral flexibility” in voters’ political judgment. I conducted this research with Oliver Hahl^[5] of Carnegie Mellon University, Ethan Poskanzer^[6] of the University of Colorado, and Ezra Zuckerman Sivan^[7] of MIT.

Why it matters

Conversations about how to combat misinformation often focus on the need for better fact-checking and education. However, our discovery illustrates the deeper but overlooked drivers behind voters’ tolerance and support for factually inaccurate statements. The findings suggest that misinformation survives not only due to voters’ “gullibility” but their moral calculations about whether partisan ends justify the means.

If voters are deliberately choosing to support misinformation because it aligns with their partisan perspectives, then providing factual corrections will not be enough to protect the democratic norm of grounding public policies in objective facts.

What still isn’t known

Our research leaves critical questions about how to combat such moral flexibility and its consequences.

To be sure, we do not see such moral flexibility as categorically wrong. As a society, for instance, we tend to think that telling kids that Santa Claus exists is unproblematic, because doing so protects certain values – such as children’s innocence and imagination.

But when it comes to public debate on an issue that should be based on objective evidence, moral flexibility limits the extent to which partisan groups can come to an agreement about facts, let alone what policy to derive from them.

What’s next

What can pull people on opposite sides of the political spectrum to cooperate with one another, if they cannot agree on what is factually correct?

There are likely more areas where partisan voters do agree with one another than the “culture war” narrative implies – and we hope to learn from them. In work in progress with sociologist Sang Won Han^[8], we are studying lawmakers who frequently co-sponsor bills with politicians in the opposite party.

Sociologists Daniel DellaPosta^[9], Liam Essig^[10] and I are also researching what contributes to politicians’ polarization in situations where opposite partisan voters actually do share a consensus. For example, a majority of both Democratic and Republican voters support background checks^[11] for gun purchases, while bills for such measures consistently fail to pass.

The Research Brief^[12] is a short take on interesting academic work.

References

1. ^{^} our research (doi.org)
2. ^{^} were not grounded in objective evidence (www.pbs.org)
3. ^{^} about COVID-19 vaccinations (www.statesman.com)
4. ^{^} could not spread the disease (www.politifact.com)
5. ^{^} Oliver Hahl (scholars.cmu.edu)
6. ^{^} Ethan Poskanzer (www.colorado.edu)
7. ^{^} Ezra Zuckerman Sivan (mitsloan.mit.edu)
8. ^{^} sociologist Sang Won Han (www.sangwonhan.com)
9. ^{^} Daniel DellaPosta (www.danieldellaposta.com)
10. ^{^} Liam Essig (sociology.la.psu.edu)
11. ^{^} support background checks (www.politifact.com)
12. ^{^} Research Brief (theconversation.com)