Anti-Syrian violence in Turkey complicates normalization process between Turkey and Syria
- Written by Sefa Secen, Postdoctoral Scholar in Political Science, The Ohio State University
Chances of a rapprochement between regional rivals Turkey and Syria were raised momentarily on July 22, 2024, with news that the leaders of both countries were set for a much-anticipated meeting[1] aimed at resolving long-standing differences. Within hours, Turkish sources dismissed the rumors of an imminent sit-down between the two leaders as false[2].
Delicacy over the matter is understandable. A recent surge in anti-Syrian violence in Turkey has highlighted the fragility of efforts to restore diplomatic ties with Syria[3], which were severed at the onset of the Syrian civil war[4].
That conflict affected Turkey in a number of ways. Ankara sided with opposition forces in Syria and eventually intervened militarily, occupying parts of the country’s north[5]. Meanwhile, fighting led to an influx of millions of refugees into Turkey, provoking anti-Syrian sentiment and, more recently, violence.
On June 30, 2024, Syrian-owned properties, vehicles and businesses in the central Turkish city of Kayseri were vandalized and set on fire following allegations of sexual abuse[6] against a Syrian man. Fueled by social media[7], attacks soon spread and sparked the most violent anti-Syrian riots to date in Turkish areas with large Syrian refugee populations.
It also prompted or inflamed violence in opposition-held northwest Syria against Turkish military positions. The region was already on edge following comments from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that signaled his desire to restore relations with the Syrian government – something that would have profound consequences for opposition-held areas.
Detente with Damascus?
Erdogan has recently called for a “new era with Syria”[8] following years of antagonism between the Turkish leader and his Syrian counterpart.
Since popular uprisings escalated into a full-blown civil war in 2012, Erdogan has viewed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as responsible for persecuting and displacing Syrians, making negotiations between the neighboring countries difficult.
But now Erdogan has suggested he is willing to meet with Assad. His hope is that a return to normalized relations would help facilitate the return of 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey and address the shared concern of a potential Kurdish state[9] in northeastern Syria.
As a political scientist focusing on security in the Middle East[10], I can see how a diplomatic breakthrough could benefit both leaders. For Erdogan, it would alleviate tensions over Syrian refugees; for Assad it represents a further sign that his regional isolation has come to an end. But elsewhere, it complicates the already complex and volatile nature of Turkey’s engagement in Syria, notably regarding its relationship with Syrian refugees and opposition groups in northwest Syria.
Anti-Syrian riots and social media
The outburst of anti-Syrian violence in Turkey came just days after Erdogan first signaled the possibility of meeting with Assad[11]. The Turkish president accused opposition parties of stoking racism and fueling tensions[12]. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya pointed to online campaigns stirring up violence, noting that 38%[13] of the “provocative and negative” posts on the evening of the rioting was produced by bot accounts.
Whoever was behind the campaign to stoke animosity, it fed into existing tensions in opposition-held northwest Syria. Hundreds of angry Syrians took to the streets in several towns, attacking Turkish trucks and removing Turkish flags[15], while demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces. In response, Turkey closed its borders with northwest Syria.
The growing anti-Turkish sentiment in opposition-held areas of Syria highlight the complicated nature of Turkey’s attempt at rapprochement with the regime in Damascus. Having established Turkey as an ardent supporter of anti-Assad forces, Erdogan now stands accused of turning his back on his erstwhile allies. Furthermore, to the refugees in Turkey who fled Assad’s crackdown, a deal that would see them returned would amount to a betrayal.
After Erdogan’s intention to meet with Assad started to circulate in the media, some factions of the Syrian opposition dubbed it “Turkey’s sellout of the opposition[16].”
Some Syrian pundits claimed that normalization with Assad was a step toward the massive forced return[17] of refugees to Syria in the face of growing public demands and electoral pressures. As was evident during the 2023 elections in Turkey[18], the return of refugees has become a politicized issue in the country.
All of this puts Erdogan in a bind. While he wants to placate the Turkish public, he doesn’t wish to anger or cut ties with the Syrian opposition, a group that he had previously cultivated ties with as a potential ally against Kurdish independence[19].
Negotiating with Assad
For some time, negotiating with the Syrian regime was considered a red line by Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym AKP. The party viewed Assad as the main actor responsible for the persecution and forced displacement of Syrians.
And until recently, Assad showed no interest in meeting with Erdogan, as he blamed him for violence in Syria through the support of rebel groups fighting the regime. However, he recently signaled[20] that “he could meet with President Erdogan as long as the sovereignty of the Syrian state over all its territory is respected and all forms of terrorism are fought.”
So why the diplomatic push for rapprochement now? Part of the answer lies in Erdogan’s desire to return Syrian refugees living in Turkey for domestic popularity reasons. Even if he fails to reach an agreement, he would be in a position to tell a public increasingly critical of the “open doors” policy[21] to Syrian refugees that engagement with Damascus has been tried but failed to produce any concrete results.
And then there is the concern shared by Turkey and Syria over the materialization of a de facto Kurdish state, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria[22], also known as Rojava, in northeast Syria. Rojava is supported by the U.S., yet recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey.
If the U.S. withdraws troops[24] from the region, Erdogan would need to negotiate Turkey’s policy toward northeast Syria with Assad.
Yet, both leaders are currently in a weak position to dictate the terms of the new order in northeast Syria. Restoring diplomatic ties would enable both countries to coordinate efforts against a shared goal of preventing an autonomous Kurdish state[25].
Foreseeing the impacts of a possible rapprochement on their political interests, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria calls[26] the diplomatic efforts a “conspiracy against the Syrian people” and a “clear legitimization of the Turkish occupation” of previously Kurdish-majority areas. The U.S. also opposes[27] normalization of relations with Syria absent “authentic progress” toward a political solution to the conflict.
Middle East’s new realities
Erdogan’s attempt to restore relations with Syria might also be viewed as an adjustment to the new political realities in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates restored[28] diplomatic relations with Syria in 2018. The Arab League also normalized[29] relations with Syria and readmitted it in 2023. Saudi Arabia also reopened[30] its embassy in Damascus in 2024.
In other words, Syria’s isolation in the region has effectively come to an end. In this regard, Ankara may have concluded that it is in its best interest to have diplomatic relations with a country that it needs to negotiate and coordinate with on a series of military, political and migration-related issues.
References
- ^ were set for a much-anticipated meeting (www.dailysabah.com)
- ^ dismissed the rumors of an imminent sit-down between the two leaders as false (www.usnews.com)
- ^ diplomatic ties with Syria (apnews.com)
- ^ Syrian civil war (www.bbc.com)
- ^ occupying parts of the country’s north (apnews.com)
- ^ allegations of sexual abuse (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ Fueled by social media (www.cnn.com)
- ^ called for a “new era with Syria” (www.aa.com.tr)
- ^ the shared concern of a potential Kurdish state (www.aljazeera.com)
- ^ security in the Middle East (scholar.google.no)
- ^ first signaled the possibility of meeting with Assad (apnews.com)
- ^ stoking racism and fueling tensions (apnews.com)
- ^ noting that 38% (balkaninsight.com)
- ^ AP Photo/Bernat Armangue, File (newsroom.ap.org)
- ^ attacking Turkish trucks and removing Turkish flags (www.cnn.com)
- ^ Turkey’s sellout of the opposition (www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr)
- ^ massive forced return (syriadirect.org)
- ^ the 2023 elections in Turkey (www.dw.com)
- ^ potential ally against Kurdish independence (carnegieendowment.org)
- ^ recently signaled (npasyria.com)
- ^ open doors” policy (www.brookings.edu)
- ^ Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (www.syriandemocraticcouncil.us)
- ^ Photo by Bakr Alkasem/AFP via Getty Images (www.gettyimages.com)
- ^ U.S. withdraws troops (warontherocks.com)
- ^ preventing an autonomous Kurdish state (www.rudaw.net)
- ^ calls (apnews.com)
- ^ also opposes (www.rudaw.net)
- ^ United Arab Emirates restored (jusoor.co)
- ^ normalized (www.reuters.com)
- ^ reopened (www.reuters.com)
Authors: Sefa Secen, Postdoctoral Scholar in Political Science, The Ohio State University
